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Abstract
In 2008, Guo et al. have shown that Lu and Cao’s simple three-party protocol for password-
authenticated key exchanges (S-3PAKE) is indeed completely insecure against a kind of man-
in-the-middle attack and the undetectable on-line password guessing attack. In addition, they
have provided an improved protocol (G-3PAKE) that addresses the identiﬁed security problems.
However, this paper demonstrates G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password
guessing attack by any other client.
c©2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAE2011.
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1. Introduction
To apply two-party password-based authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocols to a large
scale peer-to-peer system, 2PAKE protocols have a common problem, that is, each pair of com-
munication parties in a group needs to pre-share a secret. It means that each user has to keep a
large number of secrets for communicating with a group of users. To solve this problem, vari-
ous three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols were proposed
([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]). In the 3PAKE protocols, a trusted server assists each pair of users to authenticate
each other and share a session key. In addition, the user does not need to keep a large number
of secrets for a group of users. With the server’s help, each user only shares one secret with the
server in 3PAKE protocols.
Because users usually choose easy-to-remember passwords, PAKE protocols can be vulner-
able to password guessing attacks. Unlike typical private keys, the password has limited entropy,
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-53-850-7291; Fax: +82-53-850-7609.
Email address: ejyoon@kiu.ac.kr (Eun-Jun Yoon)
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
188   Sung-Bae Choi and Eun-Jun Yoon /  Procedia Engineering  24 ( 2011 )  187 – 191 
and is constrained by the memory of the user. For example, one alphanumerical character has 6
bits of entropy. Therefore, the goal of the attacker, which is to obtain a legitimate communication
party’s password, can be achieved within a reasonable time. Thus, the password guessing attacks
on PAKE protocols should be considered realistic. In general, the password guessing attacks can
be divided into three classes (Kim et al. [5], Ding et al. [6]):
• Detectable on-line password guessing attacks: an attacker attempts to use a guessed pass-
word in an on-line transaction. He/she veriﬁes the correctness of his/her guess using the
response from server. A failed guess can be detected and logged by the server.
• Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks: similar to above, an attacker tries to ver-
ify a password guess in an online transaction. However, a failed guess cannot be detected
and logged by server, as the server is not able to distinguish an honest request.
• Oﬀ-line password guessing attacks: an attacker guesses a password and veriﬁes his/her
guess oﬀ-line. No participation of server is required, so the server does not notice the
attack from a malicious one.
In 2007, Lu and Cao ([1]) proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key
exchange (S-3PAKE) protocol, where two clients, each shares a human-memorable password
with a trusted server, can construct a secure session key. They argued that their S-3PAKE pro-
tocol can resist against various known attacks. In 2008, Guo et al. ([4]), however, have shown
that Lu and Cao’s S-3PAKE protocol is indeed completely insecure against a kind of man-in-
the-middle attack and the undetectable on-line password guessing attack. In addition, they have
provided an improved protocol (G-3PAKE) that addresses the identiﬁed security problems. Nev-
ertheless, this paper demonstrates G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password
guessing attack ([3, 4, 7]) by any other client.
2. A review of G-3PAKE protocol
This section brieﬂy reviews G-3PAKE protocol ([4]).
2.1. Notations
• S , A, B: a trusted server and two clients, respectively.
• pwA, pwB: the password shared between A and S and between B and S , respectively.
• kAS , kBS : the MAC key shared between A and S and between B and S , respectively.
• G, g, p: a ﬁnite cyclic group G generated by an element g of prime order p.
• M, N: two elements in G.
• x ∈ Z∗p: randomly choosing an element x of Z∗p.
• MAC(·): a message authentication code.
• H1(·), H2(·): two secure one-way hash functions.
• ||: a bitwise concatenation.
2.2. Protocol description
Assume that two clients A and B wish to agree on a common session key. As they do not
hold any shared information in advance, they cannot directly authenticate each other and have to
resort to the trusted server S . The detailed steps of the G-3PAKE protocol, as shown in Fig. 1,
are described as follows:
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Shared Information: A, B, S , G, g, p, M, N, Z∗p , H(·), H′(·), MAC(·).
Information held by A: A, pwA; Information held by B: B, pwB; Information held by S : S , pwA , pwB.
Client A Client B Server S
⇐= 2PAKE protocol between A and S (kAS ) =⇒⇐= 2PAKE protocol between B and S (kBS ) =⇒
x ∈ Z∗p
X = gx · MpwA
δA = MACkAS (X)
A||X||δA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
y ∈ Z∗p
Y = gy · NpwB
δB = MACkBS (Y)
A||X||δA ||B||Y ||δB−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify δA , δB
gx = X/MpwA
gy = Y/NpwB
z ∈ Z∗p
gxz = (gx)z
gyz = (gy)z
X′ = gyz · H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA
Y′ = gxz · H1(B, A, S , gy)pwB
X′ ||Y′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gxz = Y′/H1(B, A, S , gy)pwB
α = H1(A, B, gxyz)
X′ ||α←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gyz = X′/H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA
Verify α
β = H1(B, A, gxyz)
S KA = H2(A, B, gxyz)
β−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify β
S KB = H2(A, B, gxyz)
Shared session key between A and B: S KA = S KB = H2(A, B, gxyz)
Figure 1: G-3PAKE protocol
Step 1. To establish a MAC key kAS , a secure 2PAKE protocol is executed between A and S .
Step 2. To establish a MAC key kBS , a secure 2PAKE protocol is executed between B and S .
Step 3. A chooses a random number x ∈ Z∗p, computes X = gx · MpwA and δA = MACkAS (X), and
then sends A||X||δA to B.
Step 4. B also chooses a random number y ∈ Z∗p, computes Y = gy · NpwB and δB = MACkBS (Y),
and then sends A||X||δA||B||Y ||δB to S .
Step 5. Upon receiving A||X||δA||B||Y ||δB, the server S ﬁrst uses the shared MAC keys kAS and
kBS to verify the MAC δA of X and the MAC δB of Y , respectively. If they do not hold,
S terminates the protocol. Otherwise, S uses the passwords pwA and pwB to compute
gx = X/MpwA and gy = Y/NpwB , respectively. Then, S chooses another random number
z ∈ Z∗p and computes gxz = (gx)z and gyz = (gy)z. Finally, S sends X′||Y ′ to B, where
X′ = gyz · H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA and Y ′ = gxz · H1(B, A, S , gy)pwB .
Step 6. Upon receiving X′||Y ′, B computes gxz = Y ′/H1(B, A, S , gy)pwB with the password pwB
and computes gxyz = (gxz)y with the random number y. B then forwards X′||α to A, where
α = H1(A, B, gxyz).
Step 7. Upon receiving X′||α, A ﬁrst computes gyz = X′/H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA and gxyz = (gyz)x.
Then, A checks whether α = H1(A, B, gxyz) holds or not. If it does not hold, A terminates
the protocol. Otherwise, A is convinced that gxyz is valid. In this case, A can compute
the session key S KA = H2(A, B, gxyz). Finally, A sends β to B for validation, where
β = H1(B, A, gxyz).
Step 8. Upon receiving β, B checks whether β = H1(B, A, gxyz) holds or not. If it does hold, B
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can compute the session key S KB = H2(A, B, gxyz). Otherwise, B terminates the protocol
Finally, both A and B share a common session key S KA = S KB = H2(A, B, gxyz).
3. Cryptanalysis of G-3PAKE protocol
This section shows that G-3PAKE protocol is insecure to an undetectable on-line password
guessing attack ([3, 4]), where a malicious client B of G-3PAKE is able to legally gain infor-
mation about the password by repeatedly and indiscernibly asking queries to the authentication
server. The attack scenario is outlined in Fig. 2. A more detailed description of the attack is as
follows:
Shared Information: A, B, S , G, g, p, M, N, Z∗p , H(·), H′(·), MAC(·).
Information held by A: A, pwA; Information held by B: B, pwB; Information held by S : S , pwA , pwB.
Client A Malicious client B Server S
⇐= 2PAKE protocol between A and S (kAS ) =⇒⇐= 2PAKE protocol between B and S (kBS ) =⇒
x ∈ Z∗p , X = gx · MpwA
δA = MACkAS (X)
A||X||δA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Choose Xˆ′ , αˆ randomly
Xˆ′ ||αˆ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Guess pw∗A
gx
′
= X/Mpw
∗
A
y ∈ Z∗p , Y∗ = (gx
′
)y · NpwB
δ∗B = MACkBS (Y
∗)
A||X||δA ||B||Y∗||δ∗B−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify δA , δ∗B
gx = X/MpwA
gx
′y = Y∗/NpwB
z ∈ Z∗p , gxz = (gx)z
gx
′yz = (gx′y)z
X′ = gx′yz · H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA
Y′ = gxz · H1(B, A, S , gx′y)pwB
X′ ||Y′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gxz = Y′/H1(B, A, S , gx
′y)pwB
gx
′yz = X′/H1(A, B, S , gx
′
)pw
∗
A
Verify (gxz)y
?
= gx
′yz
If true, then pwA ≡ pw∗A and terminate the protocol
Otherwise, guess pw∗∗A
gx
′′
= X/Mpw
∗∗
A
Y∗∗ = (gx′′ )y · NpwB
δ∗∗B = MACkBS (Y
∗∗)
A||X||δA ||B||Y∗∗||δ∗∗B−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
.
.
.
Figure 2: Undetectable on-line password guessing attack on on G-3PAKE protocol
Step 1. A operates as speciﬁed in the G-3PAKE protocol in the ﬁrst step.
Step 2. Let B be a malicious client mediating between S and A. Upon receiving A||X||δA from
the client A in Step 3 of the G-3PAKE protocol in Fig. 1, B ﬁrst randomly generates Xˆ′
and αˆ, then sends Xˆ′||αˆ to A as a message of Step 7 of the G-3PAKE protocol in Fig. 1.
A would verify αˆ. Even A may detect only once that αˆ is invalid, it really does not mean
that S detects a failure of B’s malicious trial.
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Step 3. On the other hand, B guesses a password pw∗A, and establishes an authenticated and
private channel with S . B ﬁrstly computes gx
′
= X/Mpw
∗
A for an unknown element
x′ ∈ Z∗p. Then, B selects a random element y ∈ Z∗p, and computes Y∗ = (gx′ )y · NpwB
and δ∗B = MACkBS (Y
∗). Finally B sends A||X||δA||B||Y∗||δ∗B to S in Step 4 of the G-3PAKE
protocol in Fig. 1.
Step 4. Upon receiving A||X||δA||B||Y∗||δ∗B, S ﬁrstly uses the shared MAC keys kAS and kBS to
verify the MAC δA of X and the MAC δ∗B of Y
∗, respectively. Because they always hold,
S decrypts ciphertexts X and Y∗ using MpwA and NpwB . Then S selects a random value
z ∈ Z∗p and computes
gxz = (gx)z and gx
′yz = (gx
′y)z
X′ = gx′yz · H1(A, B, S , gx)pwA and Y ′ = gxz · H1(B, A, S , gx′y)pwB
Finally S sends X′||Y ′ to B in Step 5.
Step 5. Upon receiving X′||Y ′, B computes
gxz = Y ′/H1(B, A, S , gx
′y)pwB and gx
′yz = X′/H1(A, B, S , gx
′
)pw
∗
A
B checks if (gxz)y
?
= gx
′yz. If the check passes, then B conﬁrms that the guessed password
pw∗A is the correct one.
Step 6. Otherwise, B repeatedly performs the above Steps 3-5 without being noticed by S .
Experiment to verify the proposed attack: The typical pentium computer can search ≈
17 ∗ 109 password in an hour and the supercomputer (≈ 70 ∗ 1012 per second) can search ≈
252 ∗ 1015 password in an hour ([7]). In the case of the undetectable on-line password guessing
attacks, additionally time is needed for the round trip delay time between the malicious user B
and the server S as shown in Fig. 2, beside the guessing attack costs. Based on the proposed
experiment (for the detail, please refer to our previous experiment ([7])), we can see that the
proposed password guessing attacks are feasible.
4. Conclusions
Three-party authenticated key exchange technology has been widely deployed in various
kinds of applications. In 2008, Guo et al. proposed an improved three-party password-based au-
thenticated key exchange (G-3PAKE) protocol. However, we have demonstrated that G-3PAKE
protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack by any other client. For this
reason, G-3PAKE protocol is insecure for practical application.
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